We study problems of scheduling jobs on related machines so as to minimize the makespan in the setting where machines are strategic agents. In this problem, each job j has a length lj and each machine i has a private speed ti. The running time of job j on machine i is tilj. We seek a mechanism that obtains speed bids of machines and then assign jobs and payments to machines so that the machines have incentive to report true speeds and the allocation and payments are also envy-free. We show that 1. A deterministic envy-free, truthful, individually rational, and anonymous mechanism cannot approximate the makespan strictly better than 2 − 1/m, where m is the number of machines. This result contrasts with prior work giving a deterministic PTAS for envy-free anonymous assignment and a distinct deterministic PTAS for truthful anonymous mechanism.
1. A deterministic envy-free, truthful, individually rational, and anonymous mechanism cannot approximate the makespan strictly better than 2 − 1/m, where m is the number of machines. This result contrasts with prior work giving a deterministic PTAS for envy-free anonymous assignment and a distinct deterministic PTAS for truthful anonymous mechanism.
2. For two machines of different speeds, the unique deterministic scalable allocation of any envy-free, truthful, individually rational, and anonymous mechanism is to allocate all jobs to the quickest machine. This allocation is the same as that of the VCG mechanism, yielding a 2-approximation to the minimum makespan.
3. No payments can make any of the prior published monotone and locally efficient allocations that yield better than an m-approximation for Q||Cmax [1, 3, 5, 9 , 13] a truthful, envy-free, individually rational, and anonymous mechanism.
Introduction
We study problems of scheduling jobs on related machines so as to minimize the makespan (i.e. Q||C max ) in a strategic environment. Each job j has a length l j and each machine i has a private speed t i , which is only known by that machine. The speed t i is the time it takes machine i to process one unit length of a job -t i is the inverse of the usual sense of speed. The running time of job j on machine i is t i l j . A single job cannot be performed by more than one machine (indivisible), but multiple jobs can be assigned to a single machine. The workload of a machine is the total length of jobs assigned to that machine and the cost is the running time of its workload. The scheduler would like to schedule jobs to complete in minimum time, but has to pay machines to run jobs. The utility of a machine is the difference between the payment to the machine and its cost. The mechanism used by the scheduler asks the machines for their speeds and then determines an allocation of jobs to machines and payments to machines. Ideally, the mechanism should be fair and efficient. To accomplish this, the following features of mechanism are desirable.
Individually rational A mechanism is individually rational (IR), if no agent gets negative utility when reporting his true private information, since a rational agent will refuse the allocation and payment if his utility is negative. In order that each machine accepts its allocation and payment, the payment to a machine should exceed its cost of executing the jobs.
Truthful A mechanism is truthful or incentive compatible (IC), if each agent maximizes his utility by reporting his true private information. Under truth-telling, it is easier for the designer to design and analyze mechanisms, since agents' dominant strategies are known by the designer. In a truthful mechanism, an agent does not need to compute the strategy maximizing his utility, since it is simpler to report his true information.
Envy-free A mechanism is envy-free (EF), if no agent can improve his utility by switching his allocation and payment with that of another. Envy-freeness is a strong concept of fairness [10, 11] : each agent is happiest with his allocation and payment.
Prior work on envy-free mechanisms for makespan approximation problems assumes that all machine speeds are public knowledge [6, 15] . We assume that the speed of a machine is private information of that machine. This assumption makes it harder to achieve envy-freeness. Only if the mechanism is also truthful, can the mechanism designer ensure that the allocation is truly envy-free.
In this paper, we prove results about anonymous mechanisms. A mechanism is anonymous, roughly speaking, if when two agents switch their bids, their allocated jobs and payments also switch. This means the allocation and payments depend only on the agents' bids, not on their names. Anonymous mechanisms are of interest in this problem for two reasons. On the one hand, to the best of our knowledge, all polynomialtime mechanisms for Q||C max are anonymous [1, 3, 5, 9, 15] . On the other hand, in addition to envy-freeness, anonymity can be viewed as an additional characteristic of fairness [4] .
We also study scalable allocations. Scalability means that multiplying the speeds by the same positive constant does not change the allocation. Intuitively, the allocation function should not depend on the "units" in which the speed are measured, and hence scalability is a natural notion. But allocations based on rounded speeds of machines are typically not scalable [1, 5, 13] .
The truthful mechanisms and envy-free mechanisms for Q||C max are both well-understood. There is a payment scheme to make an allocation truthful if and only if the allocation is monotone decreasing [3] . For Q||C max , an allocation is monotone decreasing if no machine gets more workload by bidding a slower speed than its true speed. On the other hand, a mechanism for Q||C max can be envy-free if and only if its allocation is locally efficient [15] . An allocation is locally efficient if a machine never gets less workload than a slower one.
The complexity of truthful mechanisms and, separately, envy-free mechanisms have been completely settled. Q||C max is strongly NP-hard, so there is no FPTAS for this problem, assuming P = NP. On the other hand, there is a deterministic monotone PTAS [5] and a distinct deterministic locally efficient PTAS [15] . This implies the existence of truthful mechanisms and distinct envy-free mechanisms that approximate the makespan arbitrarily closely. However, neither of these payment functions make the mechanisms both truthful and envy-free.
The VCG mechanism for Q||C max is truthful, envy-free, individually rational, and anonymous [8] . However, since the VCG mechanism maximizes the social welfare (i.e. minimizing the total running time), it always allocates all jobs to the quickest machines, yielding a m-approximation of makespan for m machines in the worst case. So a question is whether there is a truthful, envy-free, individually rational and anonymous mechanism that approximates the makespan better than the VCG mechanism. Since there already exists many allocation functions that are both monotone and locally efficient, one natural step to answer this question could be checking whether some of these allocation functions admit truthful and envy-free payments.
Our Results. We show that 1. A deterministic envy-free, truthful, individually rational, and anonymous mechanism cannot approximate the makespan strictly better than 2 − 1/m, where m is the number of machines. (Section 3). This result contrasts with prior results [5, 15] discussed above.
2. For two machines of different speeds, the unique deterministic scalable allocation of any envy-free, truthful, individually rational, and anonymous mechanism is to allocate all jobs to the quickest machine.
(Section 5). This allocation is the same as that of the VCG mechanism, yielding a 2-approximation of makespan for this case.
3. No payments can make any of the prior published monotone and locally efficient allocations that yield better than an m-approximation for Q||C max [1, 3, 5, 9, 13] a truthful, envy-free, individually rational, and anonymous mechanism.
Related Work. Hochbaum and Shmoys [12] give a PTAS for Q||C max . Andelman, Azar, and Sorani [1] give a 5-approximation deterministic truthful mechanism. Kovács improves the approximation ratio to 3 [13] and then to 2.8 [14] . Randomization has been successfully applied to this problem. Archer and Tardos [3] give a 3-approximate randomized mechanism, which is improved to 2 in [2] . Dhangwatnotai [9] et. al. give a monotone randomized PTAS. All these randomized mechanisms are truthful-in-expectation. However, we can show that no payment function can form a truthful, envy-free, individually rational and anonymous mechanism with any allocation function of these mechanisms. We give a proof for a deterministic allocation [13] in Section 5 and another one for a randomized allocation [3] in Appendix B.
When players have different finite valuation spaces, it is known that a monotone and locally efficient allocation function may not admit prices to form a simultaneously truthful and envy-free mechanism for allocating goods among players [7] . In this paper, we consider mechanisms where all players have identical infinite valuation spaces.
Cohen et. al. [8] study the truthful and envy-free mechanisms on combinatorial auctions with additive valuations where agents have a upper capacity on the number of items they can receive. They seek truthful and envy-free mechanisms that maximize social welfare and show that VCG with Clarke Pivot payments is envy-free if agents' capacities are all equal. Their result can be interpreted in our setting by viewing that each agent has the same capacity n and the valuation of each agent is the reverse of its cost. So their result implies that the VCG mechanism for Q||C max is truthful and envy-free; but the VCG mechanism does not give a good approximation guarantee for makespan.
Preliminaries
There are m machines and n jobs. Each agent will report a bid b i ∈ R to the mechanism. Let t denote the vector of true speeds and b the vector of bids. The cost machine i incurs by the assigned jobs is t i w i (b). Machine i's private value t i measures its cost per unit work. Each machine i attempts to maximize its utility,
The makespan of allocation w(b) is defined as max i w i (b) · t i . A mechanism (w, p) is c-approximate if for all bids b and values t, the makespan of the allocation given by w is within c times the makespan of the optimal allocation, i.e., max
where OPT (t) is the minimum makespan for machines with speeds t .
Vector b is sometimes written as (b i , b −i ), where b −i is the vector of bids, not including agent i. A mechanism (w, p) is truthful or incentive compatible, if each agent i maximizes his utility by bidding his true value t i , i.e., for all agent i, all possible t i , b i and b −i ,
A mechanism (w, p) is individually rational, if agents who bid truthfully never incur a negative utility, i.e. u i (t i , (t i , b −i )) ≥ 0 for all agents i, true value t i and other agents' bids b −i .
A mechanism (w, p) is envy-free if no agent wishes to switch his allocation and payment with another. For all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , m} and all bids b,
Notice that we use bids b instead of the true speeds t in this definition, because a mechanism can determine the envy-free allocation only based on the bids. However, a mechanism can ensure the outcome is envy-free, only if it is also truthful.
A mechanism (w, p) is anonymous if for every bid vector b = (b 1 , . . . , b m ), every k such that b k is unique and every l = k,
The condition that b k is unique is important, because in some case the mechanism may have to allocate jobs of different lengths to agents with the same bids. If mechanism (w, p) is anonymous and the bid of an agent is unique, the workload of that agent stays the same no matter how that agent is indexed. So we can write w i (b i , b −i ) simply as w(b i , b −i ) for unique b i to represent the workload of agent i. Similarly, we can write
Characterization of truthful mechanisms Lemma 1 ([3]
). The allocation w(b) admits a truthful payment scheme if and only if w is monotone decreasing, i.e., w i (b
In this case, the mechanism is truthful if and only if the payments satisfy
where the h i s can be arbitrary functions.
By Lemma 1, the only flexibility in designing the truthful payments for allocation w is to choose the terms
, which cancels out the second term in the payment formula. Thus, in order to make the mechanism individually rational, the term h i (b −i ) should be at least bi 0 w i (u, b −i ) du for any b i . Since b i can be arbitrarily large, h i should satisfy
Characterization of envy-free mechanisms
An allocation function w is envy-free implementable if there exists a payment function p such that the mechanism M = (w, p) is envy-free. An allocation function w is locally efficient if for all bids b, and all permutations π of {1, · · · , m},
Lemma 2 ([15]).
These payments are not truthful payments, since p 1 (b) is clearly not in the form of (1). But the set of envy-free payments is a convex polytope for fixed w, since payments satisfying linear constraints ∀i,
are envy-free. So there could be other payments that are both envy-free and truthful.
Lower Bound on Anonymous Mechanisms
In this section, we will prove an approximation lower bound for truthful, envy-free, individually rational, and anonymous mechanisms. Since the only flexibility when designing payments in a truthful mechanism is to choose the h i s, we need to know what kind of h i s are required for envy-free anonymous mechanisms. The following two lemmas give necessary conditions on h i s. Proof. Let β be a real number such that β < min j v j . For all i ∈ {1, . . . , m − 1}, define vector
). Since α < v j for any 0 < α < β, j ∈ {1 . . . m − 1}, we also have w i (α, v) = w i+1 (α, v) by anonymity. Thus, for truthful payments, we have
Lemma 5. Let L = k l k . If mechanism M = (w, p) is truthful, envy-free, and anonymous, then
for all t ∈ R m + and i, j ∈ {1, . . . , m}.
Proof. If machine j does not envy machine i, then p j (t) − t j w j (t) ≥ p i (t) − t j w i (t). Using (1) to substitute in for p i and p j , and Lemma 4, this yields
Rearranging terms gives
Proof of Theorem 3. Consider n = m jobs of length l = (1, . . . , 1, m). Let L := 2m − 1 denote the total length of the jobs. Define speed vector t = (mα, . . . , mα, α), where α is a real number that only depends on m and c and will be determined at the end of this section. We will show that if M is deterministic, truthful, envy-free, individually rational and anonymous, it should allocate all jobs to the quickest machine in this instance.
Claim 6. For speed vector t = (mα, . . . , mα, α) and jobs l = (1, . . . , 1, m), if M is c-approximate and w i (t) ≥ 1 for some i ∈ {1, . . . , m − 1}, then
Proof. Since M is truthful and individually rational, inequality (2) applies, and
Apply M to vector (x, t −1 ). By the local efficiency of w, job m should be assigned to the quickest machine. So for x < α, w(
Lc , all the jobs should be assigned to the machine with speed x for a makespan less than α/c. Otherwise the makespan is at least α, contradicting M is c-approximate. Since w i (mα, t −i ) ≥ 1 for some i ∈ {1, . . . , m − 1}, monotonicity implies w i (x, t −1 ) ≥ 1 for all x ∈ (α, mα). Since x ∈ (α, mα) is unique in vector (x, t −1 ), we get w(x, t −1 ) ≥ 1 by anonymity. Thus
Let t ′ = (1, mα, . . . , mα, α). Applying M to t ′ , Lemma 5 implies Let us consider the allocation M makes to machine 1 for bid vector t (i) . The speed of machine 1 is γ i−1 ≥ γ for i ≥ 2. The speed of machine i is 1. The makespan of allocating all jobs to machine i is L while the makespan of allocating at least one job to machine 1 is at least γ = cL + ǫ. Since M is c-approximate, this means w 1 (t (i) ) = 0. Using Lemma 5, we have
Since t
, . . . , m − 1}. Summing up these inequalities on all i, we have
Plugging this into (4) yields
To complete the proof of Theorem 3, consider speed vector t with α = Lc m−1 f (m, c). If mechanism M does not allocate all jobs to machine m, then w i (t) ≥ 1 for some i ∈ {1, . . . , m − 1}. Then Claim 6 implies that (5) . So M must allocate all jobs to machine m in this case, yielding a makespan of (2m − 1)α while the makespan of the schedule that assigns job j to machine j for all j is mα. Thus, M is c-approximate for some c ≥ 2 − 1/m.
Characterizing Scalable Mechanisms on Two Machines
We show that known monotone and locally efficient allocations do not have payments to form truthful, envy-free, individually rational, and anonymous mechanisms. (See Section 5 and Appendix B.)
In this section, we will show that for two machines, there is just one deterministic scalable allocation that can be made truthful, envy-free, individually rational, and anonymous. This allocation turns out to be the same allocation as the VCG mechanism.
Lemma 8. Let w be a deterministic and scalable allocation function for 2 machines. For some k > 1, if w(x, a) > 0 for all a > 0 and x < ka, then there is some g(k) > 0 such that
2k a and k > 1, we have
We also have
The first equality follows the scalability of w and we get the second equality by substituting t with ay. Since w(x, a) > 0 for all a > 0 and x < ka, we have w(1, y) > 0 for y > 1/k. In sum,
Theorem 9. Let M = (w, p) be deterministic, truthful, envy-free, individually rational, and anonymous. If w is scalable, then for two machines of different speeds, w allocates all jobs to the quickest machine.
Proof. Let L denote the total length of jobs. First, consider two machines of speed t 1 = 1 and t 2 = a (a > 1). Since M is truthful, envy-free, and anonymous, by Lemma 5, we have
Since w is individually rational, h(1) ≥ ∞ 0 w(x, 1) ≥ 0. We will show that w(ka, a) = 0 for any k > 1. For a contradiction, assume w(ra, a) > 0 for some r > 1. Let k be such that w(x, a) > 0 for x < ka and w(x, a) = 0 for x > ka. By monotonicity, such a k exists. By the assumption that w(ra, a) > 0 for some r > 1, we know that k > 1. Since w is scalable, we have for any x > ka, w(y, a) = w(a, x) = L if y/a = a/x, i.e. y = a 2 /x < a/k. Therefore,
Take a > h(1)/g(k). We have h(a) > aL + h(1) from (7). This contradicts (6).
Payments for Known Allocation Rules
Although the VCG mechanism is truthful, envy-free, individually rational, and anonymous, it does not have a good approximation guarantee for makespan. In [13] , the LPT* algorithm is described and shown to be monotone decreasing. In this section, we will show that LPT* is locally efficient and no payment function can form an envy-free, truthful, individually rational, and anonymous mechanism with the LPT* algorithm. We also prove a similar result for randomized mechanisms in Appendix B: the randomized 2-approximation algorithm in [2, 3] , whose expected allocation is monotone decreasing and locally efficient, admits no payment function that can make it simultaneously truthful-in-expectation, envy-free-in-expectation, individually rational, and anonymous. We can show similar results with similar proofs for the allocations in [1, 5, 9] .
The LPT* algorithm is the following: Let w j i be the workload of machine i before job j is assigned. Assume the jobs are indexed so that l 1 ≥ l 2 ≥ . . . ≥ l m . Note that this algorithm rounds the speeds and hence is not scalable.
Algorithm 1 LPT* Algorithm 1: Define rounded speed of machine i to be s i := 2 ⌈log bi⌉ .
2: for j = 1 to m do
3:
Assign job j to machine i that minimizes (w j i + l j ) · s i . 4: end for 5: Among machines of same rounded speed, reorder bundles on these machines so that a machine with smaller bid gets more jobs.
Lemma 10. LPT* is locally efficient.
Proof. We need to show that
So suppose s i > s k . Consider the last job, j, assigned to machine i. Since job j is assigned to machine i rather than machine k, it should be that (w
i is the workload of machine i before job j is assigned. Thus,
That is w j k ≥ 2w
There is no payment function that will make LPT* simultaneously truthful, envy-free, individually rational, and anonymous.
Proof. Let w denote the allocation of the LPT* algorithm. For a contradiction, assume there exists a payment function p such that mechanism M = (w, p) is truthful, envy-free, individually rational, and anonymous. Apply M to the problem of two jobs with lengths l 1 = 2 and l 2 = 1, and two machines with speeds t 1 = 1, t 2 = a where a > 1 and a is a power of 2. By Lemma 5, we have
Since M is individually rational, we also have
where the last inequality follows the monotonicity of w. Since a is a power of 2, the LPT* algorithm ensures w( a 4 , a) = 3 and w(2a, a) = 1. Since w is locally efficient, for any a 4 < x < a, a machine with speed x gets at least job one, i.e., w(x, a) ≥ 2. Therefore, h(a) ≥ Theorem 11 implies that local efficiency and monotonicity of an allocation are not sufficient for the existence of a payment function to form an envy-free, truthful, individually rational, and anonymous mechanism. This insufficiency of monotonicity and local efficiency still holds, even if the allocation function is also scalable. See Proposition 13 in Appendix C for more details.
Open Questions
In this paper, we establish an approximation lower bound 2 − 1/m for any deterministic, envy-free, truthful, individually rational, and anonymous mechanism while the upper bound is m given by the VCG mechanism. So one open question is whether the VCG mechanism is the best among all truthful and envy-free mechanisms.
The proof of Lemma 5 implicitly gives a characterization of mechanisms that are truthful, envy-free, and anonymous. Ideally, there would be a characterization of allocations for which there exist prices that make the resulting mechanism truthful and envy-free. Another interesting question is whether there is a characterization of truthful and envy-free mechanisms for Q||C max . Proof. Define allocation w for 2 machines to be the allocation that minimizes the makespan. If there are more than one such allocations, let w be the one that also minimizes the total completion time. It is easy to verify that w is unique. Hence w is well-defined and anonymous. w is also locally efficient and scalable, since it minimizes the makespan. Now, we show that w is monotone. 
It contradicts the optimality of O. Therefore, L ′ 2 ≤ L 2 and w is monotone. Since w is different from the VCG allocation for 2 machines, this theorem follows from Theorem 9.
